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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
JOSEPH B. MORA aka : Case No. 14071 
WESLEY JOHN HARMON, : 
Defendant-Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgement and sentence entered 
against the appellant in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, convicting him of aggravated assault. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was.tried to a jury and convicted of the crime 
of aggravated assault on April 9, 1975 and committed to the 
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law, 
the Honorable Judge Bryant H. Croft, presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks remand of the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's first witness Leslie Appling testified that she 
knew the appellant (T.86), that she saw him on November 16, 1974 
at about 6:30 in Emigration Canyon (T.86) and that she informed 
him that his girlfriend, Cindy Proctor, was at James Ingle's 
home. (T. 87) 
The State's chief witness, James Ingle, testified that 
on November 16th at 7:15 p.m. he saw the appellant Inside his 
house (T. 100, 101). He testified further that the appellant 
pulled a pistol on him (T. 103) struck him in the face, (T.104) 
cocked the gun and put it to his forehead (T. 105). Mr. Ingle 
testified that the appellant then made him answer some questions 
about Cindy Proctor and write down some information then 
calmly left (T. 110, 138). 
The appellant testified that when he went to the house of 
Mr. Ingle, that Mr. Ingle pointed a rifle at him (T. 163, 164) and 
that he knocked the rifle aside (T. 165) and pointed his gun at 
Mr. Ingle (T. 165). The appellant testified that he made Mr. 
Ingle give him some requested information concerning the whereabouts 
of his girlfriend (T. 167) and then left (T. 168). 
On the second day of trial appellant's counsel ran a motion 
to suppress introduction of evidence by the prosecutor of appellant's 
prior felony convictions (T. 182-199). The motion was denied 
(T. 199). Appellant's counsel asked the court permission to 
instruct his client to refuse to answer further questions of the 
prosecutor (T. 199) and the court ordered that he must answer the 
questions (T. 199). Appellant's counsel then chose to aske the 
question rather than have them asked by the proseuctor (T. 202). 
Appellant's counsel also requested that a lessor included instruction 
be given (T. 200) and that request was denied (T. 201). 
POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO GRANT APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL MADE AFTER THE PROSECUTOR QUESTIONED THE 
DEFENDANT CONCERNING OTHER UNRELATED CRIMES OF VIOLENCE FOR WHICH 
HE HAD NOT SUFFERED CONVICTION? 
During cross-examination and over defense counselfs objection 
the prosecutor asked the defendant six questions regarding acts 
of violence allegedly committed by him and totally unrelated 
to the case being tried (T. 204, 205). During defense counsel's 
motion for a mistrial the trial court itself admitted that this 
line of questioning was "definite error1' (T. 218). 
In State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970), 
the court said that the law clearly holds that evidence of other 
crimes is not admissable if its sole purpose is to disgrace the 
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit 
crime and thus likely to have committed the crime charged. State v. 
Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970), State v. Lopez, 22 
Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969). In the Johnson case, supra, the 
court found the error was not prejudicial in light of the statements 
made by the defendant himself on cross-examination. 
This Court has consistently held evidence of another crime to 
be prejudicial. State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 
(1961); State v. Kazada, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963). 
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In State v. Dickson, supra, the District Attorney on 
cross-examination of the defendant was allowed to question him about 
a charge that he had been an accessory to a robbery in Texas. 
The Court said: 
It's only effect was to cast aspersions upon the 
defendant and to imply that because he was involved 
in the Texas trouble he is a person of evil 
character who would be likely to commit such a 
crime as the robbery charged, at 414. 
The Court added: 
Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree of 
assurance that there would not have been a 
different result in the absence of the error 
in cross-examining the defendant about the 
incident in Texas it must be regarded as 
prejudicial and the case remanded for a new 
trial, at 415. 
The fishing expedition type of questioning by the prosecutor of the def endai 
concerning other acts of violence on two different occasions 
had no probative value to any issue in the trial. The line of 
questioning was deliberately calculated by the prosecutor to imply 
to the jury that the defendant was a "person of evil character who 
would be likely to commit1' the aggressive act charged. The only 
possible effect this line of questioning could have on the jury 
was to substantially prejudice the right of the appellant to a fair 
trial. The admission of this evidence is not the type of error 
which could be regarded as a mere irregularity or of such inconse-
quential nature that it could not have been prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the appellant. State v. Dickson, supra, 
State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957). 
POINT II 
THE COURT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OF HIS PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS WHICH DO NOT MEET PRESENT 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR REQUIRING 
REVERSAL. 
The Supreme Court has announced that prior felony convictions 
obtained in violation of the accused's right to assitance of 
counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L.Ed 2d 
799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1962), may not be used to enhance punishment 
at a subsequent trial, Burgett v. Texas 389 U.S. 109, 19 L. Ed. 
2d 319, 88 S. Ct. 258 (1967); to enhance punishment at a sentencing 
hearing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 30 L. Ed 2d 592, 
92 S. Ct. 589 (1971); or to attack the accused's credibility 
at trial, Loper v. Beto 405 U.S. 473 31 L. Ed. 2d 374, 92 S. Ct. 1014 
(1972). As the court stated in Loper 31 L. Ed 2d at 382 the "likely 
effect of impeaching the defendant's credibility is to imply, if not 
prove guilt." Admission of such convictions into evidence constitutes 
a denial of due process and reversible error, Loper, supra. As 
the court stated in Burgett and Loper supra to admit evidence of the 
convictions causes the accused in effect to suffer anew from the 
prior deprivation of a constitutional right. 
The Supreme Court has also stated that a guilty plea is 
equivalent to a conviction. 
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"A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits 
that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; 
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine 
punishment." Kerchevol v. U.S. 274 U.S. 220, 223 71 L. Ed 
1009, 1012, 47 S. Ct. 582 (1526). 
It logically follows from Burgett, Tucker, and Loper in 
conjunction with Kerchovol, that a guilty plea to a felony, made 
in violation of the defendant's right to counsel, cannot be used 
against the defendant at a subsequent trial for any purpose. 
Constitutional rights other than the right to counsel 
must be afforded a defendant before his conviction is valid. 
The Criminal defendant is afforded a privilege against self-
incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 L. Ed 2d 653, 
84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964), the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisianna, 
391 U.S. 145, 20 L. Ed 2d 491, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968), and the right 
to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 
L. Ed 2d 923, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965). A guilty plea made by a 
defendant who has not knowingly, voluntarily and on the record waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, 
and his right of confrontation is constitutionally infirm such that 
his plea is invalid and cannot stand, Boyken v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 23 L. Ed 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). 
Because Loper, supra, excluded for impeachment purposes 
the use of prior convictions constitutionally invalid because 
of the denial of counsel to the accused, it follows that Boykin, & Loper 
supra, should apply so as to exclude for impeachment purposes the 
use of prior guilty pleas constitutionally invalid because the 
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his right to trial by jury, and his right of confrontation of 
accusors. 
POINT III 
THE COURTS FAILURE TO HONOR APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY'S REQUEST 
FOR INCLUSION OF AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSOR INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF SIMPLE ASSAULT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR REQUIRING 
REMAND. 
In State v. Close, 499 P.2d 287, 28 Utah 2d 144 (1972) our 
Supreme Court considered the question of the court's instruction 
on lesser included offenses. The Court stated, "The well established 
general rule, that the jury should be instructed on lesser included 
offenses when such a conviction would be warranted by any reasonable 
view of the evidence, is in accord with and supported by our 
statutory law. Section 77-33-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
provides that "The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense 
the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which 
he is charged in the indictment or information, or of an attempt to 
commit the offense1.11 The Court listed ample Utah law on the question 
and then went on to find that the court must instruct on the lesser 
included offense even in the absence of objection. In the case 
at bar there was a request for such an instruction. 
Earlier in State v. Gilliam, 463 P.2d 811, 23 Utah 2d 372 (1970) 
our Supreme Court overruled a first degree murder conviction where 
instructions for lesser included offenses had not been given, finding 
that the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on lesser 
included offenses "if any reasonable view1 of the evidence would 
support such a verdict." 
California held likewise in People v. Dewberry, 334 P.2d 
852, 51 C. 2d 548 (1959). The California Supreme Court Justice 
Traynor writing the opinion held "That when the evidence is 
sufficient to support a finding of guilt of both the offense charged 
and a lesser included offense, the jury must be instructed that if 
they entertain a reasonable doubt as to which offense has been 
committed, they must find the defendant guilty only of the lesser 
offense.11 Idaho held likewise in Cassey v. State, 429 P.2d 836, 
91 Idaho 706 (1967). 
California's West Annotated Penal Code Section 1097 states 
"When reasonable doubt as to degree he can be convicted only 
of the lowest: When it appears that the defendant has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which 
of two or more degrees he is guilty, he can be convicted of the 
lower of such degree only.11 Idaho has a similar statute, Idaho 
Code, Section 19-2105. 
I n
 State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 168, 23 Utah 2d 34 (1966) and 
State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334, 26 Utah 2d 392 (1971) our Supreme Court 
resolved questions as to applicable sentence in favor of the 
defendants, stating in Tapp "That in case of doubt or uncertainty 
as to the degree of the crime, the defendant in a criminal case 
is entitled to the lesser." The defendant in a criminal case in 
Utah is given every benefit of the doubt as to finding of guilt, 
degree of offense and sentence given upon conviction. In the case 
at bar the court, by refusing to honor the defendant's attorney's 
request that an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
simple assault be submitted to the jury the court committed 
prejudicial error requiring reversal. See also State v. Harris 
319 P. 2d 247, 30 Utah 2d 439 (1974). 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons the appellant respectfully 
submits that the conviction and judgment rendered against him 
by the trial court be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK W. KUNKLER 
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